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Article 
“Easy In, Easy Out”: A Future for U.S. 
Workplace Representation  
Samuel Estreicher†
This paper proposes an amendment to our basic labor laws 
that I call “easy in, easy out.” Essentially, representation elec-
tions—secret-ballot votes to decide whether employees want 
union representation and whether they want to be represented 
by the particular petitioning labor organization(s)—in relative-
ly broad units, would, over time, become automatic. Every two 
years (unless the union achieved a collective bargaining agree-
ment, in which case every three years) the employees in the 
unit, after an initial minimal required showing of interest, 
would have an opportunity to vote in a secret ballot whether 
they wish to continue the union’s representation, select another 
organization, or have no union representation at all. Petition-
ing labor organizations and employers would be required to 
share certain specified information, in electronic form, with the 
voting employees. The theory is to make representation elec-
tions more like general political elections, to make it easier to 
vote in a union (if that is the employees’ preference), and to 
make it easier to vote the union out if the employees no longer 
believe the bargaining agent is accountable to them or worth 
the dues they pay. Other aspects of the labor laws would con-
tinue unchanged.  
 
 
†  Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Director, Center for Labor 
and Employment Law, New York University. Text of remarks at the Minneso-
ta Law Review Symposium on the Future of Organized Labor, Oct. 25, 2013, 
Minneapolis, Minn. Some of the ideas for this Article originated in Samuel 
Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 247 (2000), re-
printed in 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501, and in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE 
SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. 
Kaufman eds., 2002). I thank John T. Addison, John Colwell, Cynthia Estlund, 
Laurence Gold, Michael C. Harper, Barry Hirsch, Wilma Liebman, James 
Paulsen, Kye D. Pawlenko, Paul Secunda, Lee Seham, and Lafe Solomon for 
their careful read and helpful comments. All remaining errors are the au-
thor’s. Copyright © 2014 by Samuel Estreicher. All rights are reserved. 
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This proposal may be regarded by some as a quixotic en-
terprise. In many respects, labor law reform may be closer to 
the third rail of American politics than even social security (or 
healthcare) reform. My colleague Cynthia Estlund has famous-
ly complained of the “ossification” of American labor law,1 but 
at present there is no constituency for change. U.S. managers 
and owners are relatively satisfied with the state of U.S. work-
place representation, given the low rate (now under eight per-
cent) of unionization in private companies.2 They might prefer 
some alternative to the litigation system for resolution of em-
ployment disputes, but do not view union-negotiated grievance 
and arbitration systems as preferable to the status quo. Un-
ions, on the other hand, would prefer change but only if it takes 
the form of an easier path to obtaining bargaining authority, 
coupled with interest arbitration where the parties cannot 
agree on a first contract and tort remedies for recalcitrant em-
ployers.3
This paper is not about politics or political science.
 If unions cannot get that type of labor law reform, 
they prefer to stick with what they have. Employee-side plain-
tiffs’ lawyers generally thrive under the litigation system; the 
change they might seek is repeal of rules enforcing pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements covering employment disputes. In 
short, there would appear to be no obvious or stable consensus 
for labor law reform.  
4
I.  A “PUBLIC INTEREST” CASE FOR EXPANDING 
WORKPLACE REPRESENTATION?   
 It as-
sumes change is not in the offing in the near term. Rather, it 
addresses a future-law question: What sort of labor-law regime 
would make sense, given U.S. institutional arrangements, our 
legal culture, and the likely perspectives of companies (and 
their managers), unions, and the employment plaintiffs’ bar?  
Is there a public-interest case for expanding workplace 
representation? By “workplace representation,” I mean organi-
 
 1. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002). 
 2. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Un-
ion Members—2013, at 5 tbl.1 (Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/ 
news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
 3. In the proposed Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, S. 560, 
111th Cong. (2009), the NLRB would have been authorized to levy civil penal-
ties for repeat NLRA violators.  
 4. The political considerations are surveyed in Samuel Estreicher, Strat-
egy for Labor Revisited, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 413 (2012). 
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zations formed at the workplace with the consent of the affect-
ed employees that address workplace concerns through bar-
gaining with employers, whether or not the organizations be-
long to a larger labor federation, are organized as membership 
bodies governed by a constitution, or have the goals of tradi-
tional labor unions. By a “public-interest case,” I mean premis-
es that do not depend on one’s political or ideological prefer-
ences or on one’s perception of whose political or ideological 
oxen will be gored, but rather on a shared sense of what sort of 
workplace relations arrangements would help our economy 
grow and improve the welfare of all who work for a living. I 
think there is such a case.  
It has, of course, been the premise of major federal legisla-
tion beginning with the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA),5 the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,6 the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935 (NLRA),7 and similar state laws in the Northeast, 
Midwest, and Pacific Coast states8 that public policy favors the 
right of workers to form organizations of their own choosing, to 
engage in strikes and other concerted activity, and to seek to 
compel employers to bargain with them in good faith toward 
the achievement of collective contracts. The justifications for 
these laws are twofold: (1) collective representation helps work-
ers negotiate fairer contracts as a group than they could on 
their own and, in the process, boosts consumer demand for U.S. 
products and services (the “equality-of-bargaining-power” ra-
tionale);9 and (2) an administrative process for resolving labor 
relations disputes will reduce the incidence of industrial con-
flict with spillover effects on the larger society (the “industrial-
peace” rationale).10
 
 5. Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. 
§§ 151–188 (2006)).  
 
 6. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–115 (2012)). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151–169). Related provisions are also found in the Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 1947 (LMRA), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 146 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197). The NLRA and the LMRA are collectively 
referred to in the text as the NLRA.  
 8. See, e.g., Minnesota Labor Relations Act, ch. 440, 1939 Minn. Laws 
985 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 179.01–.17 (2013)). 
 9. See Bruce E. Kaufman, Why the Wagner Act? Reestablishing Contact 
with Its Original Purpose, in 7 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELA-
TIONS 15 (David Lewin, Bruce E. Kaufman & Donna Sockell eds., 1996). 
 10. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.  
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Both justifications, in somewhat modified form, still frame 
the debate. The industrial-peace rationale has limited ongoing 
reach. It does explain the continued need for special measures 
in the railroad and airlines industries11 and in the healthcare 
industry,12 as well as the power of the President to intervene in 
national emergency disputes.13
The equality-of-bargaining-power rationale has not lost its 
force, as attested by continued public agitation for higher wag-
es.
 It also explains the law’s prohi-
bition of certain weapons of economic conflict, such as the sec-
ondary boycott, which Congress feared ensnared neutral em-
ployers in disputes not of their making. But this is principally a 
reactive justification that loses its force with the declining inci-
dence of industrial strife.  
14 But in what sense does the collective-representation option 
protected by the labor laws, in the words of the NLRA, help 
“restor[e] equality of bargaining power between employers and 
employees”?15 Within the overall equality-of-bargaining-power 
objective, we need to distinguish between (1) what labor law 
does to remedy defects in the individual-worker contracting 
market (what I will call the “market-failure” concern or dimen-
sion) and (2) what it does to enhance through collective bar-
gaining (as opposed to political action) “the purchasing power of 
wage earners in industry”16
II.  THE INTEGRATIVE, NON-REDISTRIBUTIVE FACE OF 
UNION REPRESENTATION   
 (what I will call the “increasing-
employee-economic-power” concern or dimension). 
As to the market-failure concern, labor law helps solve a 
collective-action problem with individual-worker contracting. A 
common law agency—where the worker hires and can fire at-
will his own representative—does not normally obtain in the 
employment context.17
 
 11. See RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2006).  
 This is because most employees work 
 12. See LMRA § 213, 29 U.S.C. § 183 (added by Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-360, § 2, 88 Stat. 395, 396). 
 13. LMRA §§ 208–212, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176–182. 
 14. See, e.g., Karen McVeigh, Walmart Workers Protest over Minimum 
Wage in 15 U.S. Cities, GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www 
.theguardian.com/business/2013/sep/05/walmart-workers-strike-us-thursday. 
 15. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
 16. Id.  
 17. An important exception is in the entertainment and sports industries 
where high-valued talent often negotiate their own individual contracts with 
the assistance of talent agents regulated somewhat by unions. On talent agen-
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under circumstances where terms and conditions have to be 
generally applicable to all who work in similar jobs for the par-
ticular employer. Hence, individual employees usually have no 
incentive to hire agents to negotiate individualized terms be-
cause those terms would have to be extended, as a practical 
matter, to others similarly situated.18
Many of the terms negotiated in collective agreements 
have this “collective goods” feature. Consider, for example, a 
grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration as the 
final step in the process. It is certainly possible for highly paid 
individual employees to negotiate an arbitration clause for 
themselves, especially if they occupy a relatively unique posi-
tion within the firm.
 In other words, the costs 
of a negotiated improvement in collective terms would typically 
exceed the value to the individual employee of obtaining that 
improvement. Yet there are circumstances where collective im-
provements might have been negotiated if there had been some 
mechanism by which the collective costs of those improvements 
could be addressed and absorbed, in whole or in part, by all of 
the benefited employees.  
19
 
cies, see generally Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008), and H.A. Artists & 
Associates, Inc. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981). The phenomenon 
of individual bargaining over the collective agreement’s minimum terms is 
discussed in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
 But for the overwhelming number of a 
firm’s rank-and-file production, clerical, maintenance, tech-
nical, marketing, distribution, accounting, professional, and 
other non-executive workers, any dispute-resolution mecha-
nism would have to be provided, as a practical matter, to all 
workers who are similarly situated. To the employer, the costs 
of providing the mechanism (including the costs of training 
company representatives and paying for mediators and arbitra-
 18. This is the premise of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW 
§§ 2.05–.06 (Council Draft No. 10, 2013) (covering general enforceability of 
unilateral employer policy statements). The author is the chief reporter for 
this effort. 
 19. Sometimes companies and executives choose arbitration as the pre-
ferred mechanism for resolving contract disputes. See Randall Thomas, Erin 
O’Hara & Kenneth Martin, Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment Con-
tracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959 (2010). In 
the financial services industry, arbitration is required as a condition of regis-
tration with the industry’s self-regulatory organizations. See Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23–24 (1991). See generally Samuel 
Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 753 (1990); Samuel Estreicher, The Story of Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.: The Emergence of Employment Arbitration, in EM-
PLOYMENT LAW STORIES 8 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007). 
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tors) appear as a collective cost. Collective bargaining provides 
a means for workers to collectively express their preference for 
such terms, and for the parties to determine whether the collec-
tive benefits outweigh the collective costs of its provision and 
what the appropriate cost-sharing rule should be. 
Companies in non-union settings try to make this type of 
determination through their human resources (HR) depart-
ment—attempting to anticipate employee preferences and de-
signing pay and benefit packages and working conditions that 
reflect the preferences of a majority of the employees.20
Let’s return to the example of a grievance procedure. Fear 
of supervisor retaliation may deter employees from raising le-
gitimate concerns that management would address satisfactori-
ly if it knew of these concerns. Where the supervisor discour-
ages such reports, whether deliberately or because of his style 
of supervision, the supervisor is acting against the interests of 
management. In other settings, the supervisor is insisting on a 
level of work effort that may be excessive but still serves man-
agement interests. Employees wishing to retain their position 
and the good favor of their supervisor will be reluctant to press 
their concerns. Often, the company would be better off if it had 
early notice of these issues; employee problems with manage-
ment style and the intensity of supervision can adversely affect 
morale and productivity, can lead to employee quits, and can 
sometimes turn into expensive lawsuits against the company. 
 Such 
unilateral standard-setting by non-union management may 
well do a good job in many cases, but across the board there are 
areas where the approach does not work optimally from the 
employees’ perspectives. This is because employees’ reluctance 
to voice their concerns means that the HR department may not 
learn of them in time or at all. Moreover, where there is a clash 
of interests between management and employees, the HR de-
partment represents the employer’s interests.  
In the employee-benefits context, management may wish to 
shift from a traditional defined-benefit pension plan to a de-
fined-contribution pension plan. The HR department will try to 
gauge employee reaction, but sometimes it is the unit champi-
oning the initiative or is otherwise implementing a clear di-
rective from upper management. Even if receptive to employee 
concerns, HR may not be able to discern the full extent of em-
 
 20. See generally SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MAN-
AGERS, UNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
213–14 (rev. ed. 2004). 
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ployee opposition to the shift or to some feature of the new 
plan. Were these issues identifiable in advance, mitigating 
measures might be available that would still permit the shift to 
take place but with less adverse impact on, say, long-service 
employees.21
To offer another example, most companies wish to avoid 
the human and economic costs of serious on-the-job injuries, 
but managers may be unwilling to permit necessary changes in 
work routine or to authorize necessary investments in, say, en-
gineering controls that would improve workplace safety but at 
an increase in operating costs. Here, too, employees may be 
unwilling to press the point; lower- to mid-level supervision 
may not be receptive to, or may affirmatively deter expression 
of, their concerns. The company, at the upper levels, might 
have taken a different view than local managers but may not 
learn of the problem until an accident occurs or the company is 
audited by the government.
 
22
Even where employees have been given statutory rights to 
a collective good—say, occupational safety and health—the en-
forcement of those rights is often lodged with an inevitably un-
der-staffed government agency or remitted to private rights of 
action that depend on the availability of private lawyers. Col-
lective bargaining can result in an enforcement mechanism—
both in terms of identifying violations and providing relatively 
prompt redress—that is often cheaper and more effective than 
either government action or litigation.
 
23
These and other examples suggest that a case can be made 
for some form of independent worker voice to help press em-
ployee interests in settings where local supervision/manage-
 
 
 21. Problems of this sort occurred in connection with IBM’s attempt to 
move from a traditional defined-benefit pension plan to a “cash balance” plan, 
also a defined-benefit plan but one which tends to favor long-term workers less 
than the traditional plan. See generally The Official National Site for the IBM 
Employees’ Union CWA Local 1701, AFL-CIO, ALLIANCE@IBM, http://www 
.endicottalliance.org (last updated Apr. 2, 2014). The Seventh Circuit upheld 
IBM’s conversion to a cash balance plan against a challenge under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–633(a) (2012), in 
Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 22. See David Weil, Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 
INDUS. REL. 20 (1991).  
 23. See generally Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law 
Reform: Opening Up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 827 (1996); Stewart J. Schwab, The Union as Broker of Employment 
Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOY-
MENT LAW 248 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012). 
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ment may be opposed but the employee demands are not incon-
sistent with the overall interests of the firm. This is essentially 
the integrative, non-redistributive case for workplace represen-
tation.24 By the term “integrative,” I am suggesting a worker-
organization role that does not detract from the company’s re-
turn on investment and that helps achieve worker objectives 
without materially increasing operating costs to the company.25
III.  THE ADVERSARIAL, REDISTRIBUTIVE FACE OF 
UNION REPRESENTATION   
  
The increasing-employee-economic-power objective of the 
labor laws, by contrast, envisions not merely an improvement 
in the contracting process—in the ability of the firm to achieve 
its goals—but also a strengthening of labor’s leverage in bar-
gaining with the employer. Whether the economic surplus pro-
duced by the firm expands or not, this objective seeks a larger 
share of the surplus for the employees. Improved bargaining 
outcomes are said to result from the expertise of union negotia-
tors, the building up of union strike funds to enable workers to 
hold out for desired terms for longer periods of time than they 
could on their own, and, in some cases, the ability of the union, 
in alliance with other organizations, to impose increased labor 
costs (derived from the union’s economic gains) on all competi-
tors in the same product market. This is the redistributive case 
for workplace representation—that workers can obtain a larger 
part of the economic returns from the firm’s operations than 
workers could without collective representation.  
Most workers who vote for, and are willing to pay dues to, 
unions expect union representation to bring higher wages, rich-
er benefits, and better working conditions. Effecting such out-
 
 24. Samuel Estreicher, “Think Global, Act Local”: Employee Representa-
tion in a World of Global Labor and Product Market Competition, 4 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 81, 85 (2009). 
 25. This terminology originated in a description of models (or styles) of 
collective bargaining in RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BE-
HAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (Seymour E. Harris ed., 1965). I 
first used it in describing models of unionism in Samuel Estreicher, Models of 
Workplace Representation for an Era of Global Labor and Product Market 
Competition, in LABOUR LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: LIBER 
AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF RUTH BEN-ISRAEL 51 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2001), 
and further developed the concept in Estreicher, supra note 24, at 85. The 
basic dichotomy between “integrative” and “redistributive” workplace repre-
sentation is inspired by the distinction between the “voice” and “monopoly” 
face(s) of unions in RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UN-
IONS DO? 6–7 (1984).  
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comes is also how union leaders see their primary objective. 
And there are situations (usually where firms face limited 
product market competition) where unions are able to obtain 
such improvements from the employer without harming the 
employer’s position in the market or financial health.26 Where 
this occurs, the unions help boost the purchasing power of rep-
resented workers, with some positive spillover effects for non-
union employees of companies who anticipate being targeted 
for union organizing down the road and attempt to ward off 
such efforts by adopting the economic or other terms of union-
ized employers.27 Collective bargaining here can help reduce 
the extra-competitive returns monopoly firms enjoy.28 This is 
what my colleague Richard Epstein (no fan of unionism or col-
lective bargaining) calls a “bilateral monopoly,”29 and suggests 
a limited public-interest case for a redistributive model of 
workplace representation.30
It is not always clear, however, whether unions can achieve 
these objectives and, if they can, whether these gains come out 
of the employer’s profits or are ultimately paid for by other 
means.
 
31 Many economists would say that if unions take away 
from firm profits, they undermine the firm’s economic perfor-
mance and its prospects for growth.32
 
 26. Samuel Estreicher, Trade Unionism Under Globalization: The Demise 
of Voluntarism?, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 415, 419 (2010).  
 In this account, signifi-
 27. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 152–53.  
 28. See infra note 32. 
 29. See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Cri-
tique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1385 (1983). 
 30. See Richard Freeman’s interesting essay on labor’s new role in the 
face of financialization of U.S. industry. Richard Freeman, New Roles for Un-
ions and Collective Bargaining Post the Implosion of Wall Street Capitalism, in 
THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: NEGOTIAT-
ING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 254 (Susan Hayter ed., 2011).  
 31. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American La-
bor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 419 (1992), for a valiant effort to defend redistributive unionism.  
 32. Unions affect investment and the growth of the firm. See WHAT DO 
UNIONS DO? A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 16–20 (James T. Bennett & Bruce 
E. Kaufman eds., 2007). Their effect on profits is ambiguous; studies find a 
limited effect in competitive industries and a much more significant effect in 
concentrated industries (where profits might be considered “monopoly rents” 
and presumably it would be easier to pass on the costs of the labor contract to 
the consumer). See generally John T. Addison & Clive R. Belfield, Unions and 
Employment Growth: The One Constant? 11–12 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, 
Discussion Paper No. 479, 2002), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp479.pdf (dis-
cussing unions’ adverse effects on employment growth and profitability). Un-
ions do not, however, drive companies out of business. See Richard B. Freeman 
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cant union wage gains of this sort will tend to be short-lived, 
unless the company has physical assets in place it cannot easily 
move or dispose of.33
Whatever one’s view of the net benefits of the redistribu-
tive role of unions for the employees involved or the larger soci-
ety, they are harder to come by in today’s world. In large part 
because of the effects of technology, deregulation, and global 
product and labor market competition, unions increasingly face 
difficulty compelling competitors of unionized firms to operate 
on the same terms.
 Otherwise, the firm will either move to a 
less union-friendly region or reduce its investment level in the 
unionized part of its business. More likely, any union wage 
gains will come at the expense of the employment level at the 
unionized business, as the company substitutes capital for la-
bor and lower-priced subcontractors for its own people. In 
short, we are told, higher union-negotiated wages invariably 
means fewer available jobs at those wages. 
34
The question for people who care about workplace repre-
sentation is whether the social benefits of employee organiza-
tion can be preserved without inviting, or fostering, aspects of 
redistributive trade unionism that can create a downward spi-
ral for unionized companies.  
 If the unionized firm cannot be insulated 
from competition on the basis of labor costs, that firm will not 
for long continue to bear the costs of the union-negotiated wage 
and benefit package. Again, the firm has a number of options—
it can substitute capital for labor, leave the region, deprive its 
unionized plant of needed capital investment, transfer assets to 
purchasers who will operate on a non-union basis, take a strike 
to force a lower-cost contract, or go into bankruptcy. 
IV.  THE EUROPEAN TWO-CHANNEL APPROACH TO 
WORKER REPRESENTATION   
Continental European countries offer a potential alterna-
tive approach. These countries typically provide a dual track of 
representation: (1) works councils that operate at the firm level 
 
& Morris M. Kleiner, Do Unions Make Enterprises Insolvent?, 52 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 510, 526 (1999). 
 33. See, e.g., Barry T. Hirsch, Unions, Dynamism, and Economic Perfor-
mance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOY-
MENT LAW, supra note 23, at 107, 131–32.  
 34. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive 
Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 12–15 (1993); Estreicher, supra note 
24, at 82–91. 
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as a consultative organ without the right to strike or negotiate 
wages;35 and (2) trade unions that operate at the multi-
employer level to negotiate wages and other economic terms for 
broad sectors of industry. Employers are under no legal duty to 
bargain with unions, but extension laws enable labor ministries 
to impose collective bargaining contracts on unorganized sec-
tors of industry.36 Unions play an informal role in the works 
councils; their representatives often secure elected work counci-
lor positions.37 But works councils have their own legal status 
with statutory rights to information and to be consulted over 
important firm decisions, such as layoffs and the introduction 
of new technology.38
Collective bargaining occurs at the multi-enterprise level 
with employers organized into large multi-employer federations 
negotiating a minimum-terms agreement with the national, re-
gional, or sectoral federation of unions. Because many compa-
nies of different size and economic position are represented 
through the employer federations, and firm participation, in 
the first instance, is voluntary (although subject to the prospect 
of extension decrees),
  
39 the collective agreement must be keyed 
to the economic situation of the median or maybe even to the 
economically weaker members of the employer federation. If a 
company wishes to pay wages above the collectively-bargained 
minimum, as it may have to in order to retain its workers, this 
is done in an informal manner after consultation with the 
works council.40
 
 35. See generally Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear, An Economic 
Analysis of Works Councils, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESEN-
TATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 27 (Joel Rogers & Wolf-
gang Streeck eds., 1995). 
 These above-the-collective-contract wages are 
typically not legally binding, but subject to unilateral modifica-
tion by the employer when its position worsens. 
 36. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER, GLOBAL ISSUES IN LABOR LAW 177–83 
(2007); Estreicher, supra note 34, at 15–17 & n.49.  
 37. See ESTREICHER, supra note 36, at 219 (“It is estimated that about 
80% of those sitting on a [German] works council belong to a union.”). 
 38. See Freeman & Lazear, supra note 35, at 27, 29. 
 39. See ESTREICHER, supra note 36, at 177, 180–81, 218. 
 40. See John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira & Thomas Zwick, German 
Works Councils and the Anatomy of Wages, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 247, 
248 (2010); Sven Jung & Claus Schnabel, Paying More Than Necessary? The 
Wage Cushion in Germany, 25 LABOUR 182, 183 (2011). The claim that works 
councils have positive effects on firm productivity is challenged in John T. Ad-
dison et al., German Works Councils in the Production Process 22 (Inst. for the 
Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 812, 2003). For an overall positive as-
sessment of works councils, see Freeman & Lazear, supra note 35. 
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Many Continental European countries are handicapped by 
rigid aspects of their labor systems (although more flexible 
rules have been under discussion). Critics of the European ap-
proach point to legislation that prohibits discharge without 
cause, mandates that buyers of companies retain the prior 
workforce and wage and benefit levels, and requires cumber-
some negotiation of restructuring plans and payment of sever-
ance benefits before layoffs can take place. 
Even if aspects of the European model were otherwise de-
sirable, however, no magic wand is available to transplant it to 
the United States. Aside from the lack of political will, there is 
a fundamental problem of institutional fit because unions in 
this country operate as bargaining agents at the company level. 
Either the works councils would entirely displace unions, or 
they would be unions in all but name.41
We need an American solution that fits American institu-
tional arrangements and legal culture. 
 The very feature of the 
European model that may be most attractive—the separation of 
the integrative and redistributive roles of workplace organiza-
tion—could not be readily accomplished. 
V.  THE BASIC PROPOSAL: FROM “HARD IN, HARD OUT” 
TO “EASY IN, EASY OUT”   
The basic proposal here is to convert what is now a “hard 
in, hard out” system for deciding whether employees obtain 
workplace representation, to an “easy in, easy out” system. 
Current arrangements make it very difficult for a union to ob-
tain bargaining authority and therefore very expensive for a 
union to organize new workers. Sometimes a union can secure 
the employer’s voluntary recognition because the company 
needs support for a critical regulatory approval,42
 
 41. Volkswagen is apparently considering a German-style works council 
at its Chattanooga, Tennessee plant. Jack Ewing & Bill Vlasic, VW Plan 
Opens Door to Union and Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2013, at B1. In Febru-
ary 2014, the employees at the Chattanooga plant voted against representa-
tion by the United Automobile Workers (UAW), even though the company 
supported the union bid and the union had indicated receptivity to the works-
council idea. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Regroups in South After VW Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/business/labor 
-regroups-in-south-after-vw-vote.html. The union is challenging the election 
results. Id. 
 it wishes to 
be relieved of the pressures of a union-mounted “corporate 
 42. See, e.g., Harry C. Katz et al., The Revitalization of the CWA: Integrat-
ing Collective Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing, 56 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 573, 580 (2003).  
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campaign,”43 or the parent foreign corporation acquiesces to un-
ion representation for its U.S. affiliate in order to stay on good 
terms with its own domestic unions.44
More typically, a fight ensues. The union files a petition for 
a representation election with the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB). The petition triggers an administrative process 
during which an intense, often bitter campaign is mounted by 
both sides to affect the outcome of the election.
 Where unions have this 
sort of leverage, the company will recognize the union (upon 
proof of majority support)—for at least some of its operations—
without a fight. 
45
The fight is so intense because the stakes are high. They 
are certainly high for the employer who faces the prospect of a 
third-party bargaining agent likely—if the union’s record and 
its current promises to its employees are a good guide to the fu-
ture—to seek costly wages and benefit terms and cumbersome 
work rules. The union may, of course, temper its bargaining ob-
jectives and rhetoric once it is in place, but the employer faces 
considerable uncertainty, which it tends to resolve by fighting 
the organizing drive.
 Normally, the 
election results are also hardly the end of the matter, as at 
least two years of litigation awaits the resolution of unfair la-
bor-practice issues resulting from the campaign. 
46
The stakes are also high for the workers involved because 
their job security will depend on the continued economic health 
of the employer. A good number of the workers may be dissatis-
fied with their wages or their supervisors—after all, unions do 
not try to organize facilities without some worker support, and 
need thirty percent of a bargaining unit to obtain an NLRB 
election. But once workers hear their employer’s concerns about 
the adverse consequences of unionization or the record of the 
 
 
 43. See Estreicher, supra note 26, at 423. See generally JAROL B. 
MANHEIM, THE DEATH OF A THOUSAND CUTS: CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS AND 
THE ATTACK ON THE CORPORATION (2001). 
 44. Cf. Anne Tempel et al., Subsidiary Responses to Institutional Duality: 
Collective Representation Practices of US Multinationals in Britain and Ger-
many, 59 HUMAN REL. 1543 (2006).  
 45. See generally Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace, 77 MINN. L. 
REV. 495 (1993). 
 46. This is why the law should allow framework agreements between em-
ployers and unions that do not take effect until the union is able to demon-
strate majority support in an appropriate unit. See Montague v. NLRB, 698 
F.3d 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2012); Samuel Estreicher & Andrew M. Kramer, NLRB 
Allows Pre-Recognition Framework Agreement, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 23, 2011, at 4.  
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particular union, they often will tend to resolve uncertainty by 
voting “no union.”47
The union, too, cannot readily afford to lose. A loss means 
that resources invested in the organizing drive have gone to 
waste and sends a signal to other employers in the industry, 
some of whom may be under union contract, that the union 
lacks “muscle,” that it cannot impose its collectively-bargained 
terms on the non-union sector. The likely calculus for the union 
is to avoid organization and contested elections altogether and 
pursue a “corporate campaign” or other means of placing pres-
sure on companies to submit at least part of their operations to 
unionization. Moreover, unions increasingly appear to be mov-
ing in the direction of becoming more of a political movement 
than a collective-bargaining agency.
 
48
The thesis of this paper is that the stakes can be consider-
ably lowered by making it easier for workers to disavow or 
change union representation after they have had a chance to 
experience it. Under present rules, the path to union represen-
tation is “hard in” (as discussed), but the exit from union repre-
sentation is also “hard out.” Whether the union obtains its bar-
gaining authority informally (by the employer’s voluntary 
recognition or simply the operation of the contract over time) or 
formally (through NLRB certification after a representation 
election), decertification requires an election.
  
49
 
 47. I agree with the views of commentators that employer opposition to 
the union drives down employee support for the union. See, e.g., Benjamin I. 
Sachs, Union Organizing and the Architecture of Employee Choice, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, su-
pra note 
 Moreover, a pe-
tition requires a thirty-percent showing of interest among the 
workers and cannot be filed during the “insulated period”—
usually a year from certification (with the period of unfair labor 
practices tacked on)—that the union is given by law to demon-
23, at 146, 157–59. I question, however, whether that effect is due to 
unlawful opposition, rather than simply the fact of employer opposition. I also 
question the premise that employer opposition does not provide useful infor-
mation to the employees considering whether to unionize or not.  
 48. This move is openly endorsed in Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled 
Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013). 
 49. Interestingly, “hard out” is also a feature of the Canadian “easy in” 
system. See Micah Berul, Revitalizing American Labor Through Canadian-
Style Certification Reform: Is It in the Cards?, in GLOBAL COMPETITION AND 
THE AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT LANDSCAPE: AS WE ENTER THE 21ST CENTURY 
939, 977–78 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 2000).  
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strate its effectiveness as a bargaining agent.50 If a contract is 
in place, workers dissatisfied with the union, again with the 
requisite thirty-percent showing of interest, must time their pe-
tition during a narrow window no earlier than ninety days be-
fore nor later than sixty days before the expiration of the con-
tract.51 If a renewal contract is entered into with a term of three 
years of more, the NLRB will not recognize a decertification pe-
tition for another three years except for the ninety-to-sixty day 
window period from expiration of the new agreement.52
Under present law, employers may not give any assistance 
to the decertification effort.
  
53 Even so much as telling employ-
ees their rights to file such a petition and allowing them time 
off from work or giving them carfare to go to the NLRB regional 
office to file it will lead to disallowance of the petition or nullifi-
cation of the election results.54 Employers are not permitted to 
poll their workers, even by means of a secret ballot, unless they 
already have an objective, good-faith doubt of the union’s ma-
jority.55 Even if workers no longer pay their dues or go to union 
meetings, and a good number come to management on their 
own to disavow the union, the NLRB is likely to rule the em-
ployer’s withdrawal of recognition to be an unfair labor prac-
tice,56
 
 50. See NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (2012); Kye D. Pawlenko, 
Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal to Resurrect Rival Union-
ism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 651, 653 (2006). 
 and is likely, under current practice, not to hold an elec-
tion until this and other unfair labor practice charges are 
resolved (the agency’s so-called “blocking charge” policy). Add 
to all of this the virtual disappearance of rival unionism, and 
the prospect of competition among union organization is quite 
remote.  
 51. See Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 (1962); 
Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 247, 250 
(2000), reprinted in 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501; Pawlenko, supra note 50, 
at 653. 
 52. Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 125 (1962); Pawlenko, supra 
note 50, at 653. 
 53. Estreicher, supra note 51, at 250. 
 54. See Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.3d 209, 211–
12, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
 55. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 361, 
280 (1998). 
 56. See Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., 333 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001) (ruling 
that employers may withdraw recognition from a union only if they can prove 
that the union in fact has lost its majority support). 
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Additionally, full rights of participation in the union are 
limited to union members. Unless represented employees are 
willing to become full-fledged union members—which entails 
higher dues (which reflect to some extent union political ex-
penditures), union duties like manning a picket line, and the 
risk of union discipline for, say, refusing to honor a picket 
line—they have no say in the internal governance of the union. 
Most especially, they have no say over important economic de-
cisions such as whether to accept the employer’s final offer, 
whether to vote for strike authorization, whether to end a los-
ing strike, and whether to ratify the contract negotiated by the 
union on their behalf. 
Considered on their own terms, these rules make sense, 
furthering legitimate interests in giving new bargaining agents 
a chance to show their wares, promoting bargaining stability 
once contacts are reached, keeping the employer as much out of 
the process as possible, and preserving union autonomy by sep-
arating out the rights of union members from those of non-
member represented employees. The net effect, however, is to 
create a fairly high barrier to exiting a union-representation 
regime or even being able to change bargaining representa-
tives. It would be as if our vote for President of the United 
States or mayor of a large city were in substance a vote for an 
indefinite term, with the only chance of getting a vote to review 
the incumbent requiring a showing of support by thirty percent 
of the electorate and a limited period of time to file a petition, 
and no realistic prospect of competing bids for office.  
A. “EASY IN” COMPONENT  
The basic proposal has two elements: the first is “easy in”; 
the second is “easy out.” Both are necessary. Both borrow from 
the experience of our general political elections. Both require a 
revision of the representation-election provisions of the basic 
labor laws, the NLRA, and the RLA.  
The “easy in” component would apply to workers not pres-
ently represented by a labor organization57
 
 57. For purposes of this proposal, I adopt the definition of “labor organiza-
tion” in section 2(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012). Such an organiza-
tion cannot be employer-supported or -dominated under section 8(a)(2) of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). See generally Samuel Estreicher, Employee In-
volvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal 
of § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1994). Such an organization 
would also be subject to the union democracy and fiduciary safeguards of the 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), Pub. L. 
 for collective bar-
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gaining purposes. On a limited showing of interest, workers 
would have an automatic right, once every two years—say, on 
the second Monday after Labor Day—to cast a secret-ballot 
vote on whether they wish to be represented by a union and 
whether they wish to be represented by one of the petitioning 
unions. The NLRB and the National Mediation Board (NMB), 
its counterpart under the RLA, would be empowered to prom-
ulgate rules establishing in advance, and without the require-
ment of a hearing, appropriate bargaining units for the election 
and at least initial bargaining. The electorate would be all full- 
and part-time employees on the payroll by, say, Labor Day. The 
election would be decided by a majority of the votes cast within 
the particular unit. If a majority of the workers in the unit 
votes against union representation, the agency could not hold 
another election for a year.58 If the majority of the workers in 
the unit votes for representation by one of the petitioning un-
ions, that union would be automatically certified as the bar-
gaining agent for a period of two years. The employer would be 
under a statutory duty to bargain with the certified union, as it 
is under present law.59
B. “EASY OUT” COMPONENT 
 A run-off election would be held if no 
choice won a majority on the first ballot.  
The “easy out” component would apply to any bargaining 
unit of workers covered by the NLRA or RLA for whom a union 
has been certified as the statutory bargaining agent, whether it 
achieved a collective bargaining contract or not. The workers in 
the unit would be able after two years to vote in an automatic 
secret-ballot election to decide whether they wished to continue 
the representation of the certified bargaining agent, whether 
they wanted no representation at all, or whether they wished to 
be represented by another, petitioning union. As with the ini-
tial election, a majority vote for no representation would pre-
clude an NLRB election for another year; a vote to continue 
representation by the certified agent or to be represented by 
another union would preclude an election for a period of two 
years.  
 
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531). I relax 
the latter assumption in Estreicher, supra note 51, at 255.  
 58. This corresponds to the one year “election bar” in section 9(c)(3) of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3). 
 59. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).  
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C. ADDITIONAL FEATURES 
1. Showing of Interest 
It may inadvisable, given the number of potential bargain-
ing units across the country, to incur the costs of running an 
election without some limited showing of interest on the part of 
the affected workers. I have in mind a five-to-ten percent show-
ing in an appropriate unit. Some have suggested retaining a 
thirty-percent requirement for the initial representation elec-
tion.60
These arguments have merit but have to be balanced 
against the desirability of relatively easy access to representa-
tion elections—the “easy in” feature of the basic proposal. Un-
ions as petitioning organizations would generally wait until 
they have substantial support before they would call for an 
election. The proposal envisions situations where unorganized 
workers may seek representation even in advance of any estab-
lished union organization appearing on the scene.  
 Two reasons have been offered: First, unions generally 
are going to want to be able to sign up at least thirty percent of 
the workers before they petition for an election that requires 
they win over a majority in a secret-ballot election. Second, giv-
en the number of potential bargaining units, it would be a 
waste of scarce administrative resources to require an election 
where this level of interest cannot be manifested. Any renewal 
election would be automatic after two years, without requiring 
a showing of interest.  
2. Access 
Elections require an informed electorate. The NLRB has 
authority under current law to give a union limited access to 
employees once the required showing of interest for an election 
has been demonstrated.61 Presently, the agency requires only 
that the employer provide contact information for unit employ-
ees.62
 
 60. Interview with Lafe Solomon, Former Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, in 
N.Y.C. (Oct. 21, 2013). 
 This could be extended to requiring union access to non-
work areas like the parking lot, cafeteria, and break room, and 
 61. See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National 
Labor Relations Act Without Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 
14–15 (2009). 
 62. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239–40 (1966).  
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could be conditioned on compliance with reasonable security 
procedures.63
3. Election Units 
 
A significant policy choice for Congress would be whether 
to codify the existing bargaining-unit structure adopted by the 
NLRB and NMB, or to guide the process by stipulating the unit 
structure that would obtain in the absence of affirmative agen-
cy action to change the default rule. Broad, inclusive units—
say, one unit of all hourly workers at a given physical location 
and one unit of all salaried, non-professional and non-
managerial workers at that location—would be more likely to 
foster an integrative perspective by the union than smaller 
units. Broad units would also cut down the number of elections 
that need to be conducted. Unions are likely to object because it 
is harder for a union to win a large unit and there may be a se-
rious heterogeneity of employee perspectives in such a unit 
complicating effective collective action.64
4. Rival Bids  
  
Where a petition has been filed with, say, a thirty-percent 
showing of interest, a rival organization should be able to get 
on the ballot by making a five-percent showing of interest. No-
tice of the initial organization’s bid would be published on the 
NLRB or NMB website, and rival organizations would have, 
say, up to thirty days to make the required showing. The date 
of renewal elections would also be published on the agency’s 
website, which rival organizations would be likely to monitor if 
interested in making a bid. Rival unions would need to make 
the same five-percent showing of interest to get on the renewal 
election ballot.  
5. Contract Bar  
Under present NLRB law, a collective bargaining agree-
ment with a fixed duration of three or more years bars a repre-
sentation election for three years, save for the ninety-to-sixty 
 
 63. See Estreicher, supra note 61, at 15–16. 
 64. These objections from the union side merit further evaluation. The ex-
perience under the RLA and during the early years of the NLRA suggests, 
however, that unions can win large units. In any event, the NLRB should not 
hold elections in small units that are not viable bases for collective bargaining. 
See NLRA § 9(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (specifying that the extent of organi-
zation cannot be a determinative factor in unit determination). 
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day window period. This bar promotes an important interest in 
contract stability. It can be preserved under an “easy in, easy 
out” regime by deferring the automatic renewal vote to three 
(or possibly four) years, but without requiring any showing of 
interest on the part of the affected workers to trigger such a 
vote.  
6. Mandatory Disclosure  
One way to de-escalate the atmosphere of representation 
elections is to require disclosure of appropriate information to 
enable workers to discount campaign propaganda and make in-
telligent voting decisions. The NLRB or NMB could be author-
ized to require petitioning unions to disclose what they would 
charge for dues and other fees, whether workers would have a 
right to vote on strike authorization and contact ratification 
without becoming union members, and whether workers as un-
ion members would be subject to union discipline and for what 
reasons. Unions might also be required to disclose basic terms 
of the collective bargaining agreements they have achieved in 
the same industry or location. Employers could be required to 
make appropriate disclosure of their economic performance at 
the particular business level, say, at the level of the facility and 
its business division within the company. If such information, 
not usually part of even a public company’s publicly available 
annual reports, requires confidential treatment, disclosure 
could be limited to accountants or other professional interme-
diaries who would report back to the union or workers in a 
manner that would not entail a breach of confidence. These 
rules could be liberalized by contract after a union obtains bar-
gaining authority.  
7. Grandfathering  
Some grandfathering will be required to avoid disruption 
in existing units. One option is to allow existing bargaining re-
lationships to continue indefinitely, subject to existing rules for 
decertification and employer withdrawal of recognition. A bet-
ter approach would be to exempt existing relationships from 
the new “easy in, easy out” regime for a substantial fixed period 
of, say, five or ten years.  
8. Voluntary Recognition  
Where there is no existing certified representative, em-
ployers should be permitted voluntarily to recognize a union on 
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a showing of majority support in one of the agency-designated 
appropriate bargaining units. The recognition would have the 
same effect as an NLRB certification, and would be subject to 
an automatic secret-ballot renewal election after two years (ab-
sent a contract of three years’ duration or more).  
9. Bargaining Structure  
As under current law, the parties would be free to bargain 
on a broader basis than the initial election unit. Any continua-
tion of bargaining authority in non-grandfathered units would 
be subject to an automatic secret-ballot renewal election in the 
same unit where the initial election was held.  
10. LMRDA-Compliant Labor Organizations  
Another important policy choice for Congress is to decide 
whether to limit eligibility for bargaining authority to labor or-
ganizations that comply with the democracy and fiduciary safe-
guards of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
(LMRDA).65 As I have written elsewhere,66 it is not entirely 
clear that workers are well-served by effectively limiting the 
pool of available bargaining agents to LMRDA-compliant non-
profit membership associations.67 The recent emergence of so-
called “workers’ centers,” principally funded by foundations, is 
a case in point.68
 
 65. See LMRDA §§ 501–504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 501–504; LMRDA § 505 (amend-
ing LMRA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186). 
 There would seem to be no good reason why 
single-purpose worker groups interested only in, say, bargain-
ing over healthcare or retirement benefits could not vie for bar-
gaining authority under this proposal. Of course, if they have 
no desire to bargain with the employer, they have no need for 
bargaining authority under the “easy in, easy out” regime. Or-
ganizations that combine collective bargaining with career-
building and referral services or professional associations that 
 66. See Estreicher, supra note 51, at 254–55.  
 67. Neither the NLRA nor the RLA require compliance with the LMRDA, 
but labor organizations may not be functioning lawfully if they fail to comply 
with the LMRDA. It is conceivable, in theory, that an individual could be certi-
fied as a bargaining agent under section 9 of the NLRA, but this rarely occurs.  
 68. See generally U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE NEW MODEL OF REP-
RESENTATION: AN OVERVIEW OF LEADING WORKER CENTERS (2014), available 
at http://www.workforcefreedom.com/sites/default/files/WFI%20Worker% 
20Center%20Study%20-%20New%20Model%20of%20Representation.% 
20Final%20version%20downloaded%202.20.14.pdf. 
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also include supervisors may offer other examples of desirable 
options for some workers.  
* * * 
The “easy in, easy out” proposal is not a panacea but it 
does hold promise for a possible future for U.S. workplace rep-
resentation.  
